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Case Comment: Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet
Service Providers
By Barry Sookman†
Introduction Findings of the Copyright Board6
he Copyright Board cannot target persons who arehe exponential growth of the Internet has raised T not users of copyright. For this reason, and becauseT serious issues related to liability for copyright
Tariff 22 raised novel issues, the Board ordered that theinfringement. Who should compensate authors and
proceedings be broken down into two phases. Phase Ipublishers for the use of their works? What activities
would determine which actions trigger liability underconstitute infringement? Are Internet intermediaries
the Act and which do not. The issues put before thesuch as Internet service providers (ISPs) liable for
Board were the following:infringement when they provide connectivity to sub-
scribers, when they provide hosting services, or when 1. What do ‘‘communication’’, ‘‘telecommunica-
they use caching technologies? Where does infringement tion’’, ‘‘public’’, and ‘‘musical work’’ mean in the
occur? Is the scope of the Copyright Act1 limited to acts context of Internet transmissions?
of infringement that occur wholly within Canada or
2. When does a communication to the public occurdoes the Act apply to acts that take place partly in
on the Internet?Canada and partly outside of Canada? In the SOCAN v.
Canadian Association of Internet Providers 2 case 3. Who communicates on the Internet? In partic-
(Tariff 22) the Supreme Court of Canada tackled these ular, who can benefit from paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of
questions. the Act?
The appeal to the Supreme Court arose out of a 4. When does the act of authorizing a communica-
tariff filed by SOCAN known as Tariff 22. This tariff was tion on the Internet occur?
filed in respect of the following licence:
5. When does a communication on the InternetFor a licence to communicate to the public by telecommu-
occur in Canada?7nication, in Canada, musical works forming part of
SOCAN’s repertoire, by a telecommunications service to
The Board answered these questions as follows:subscribers by means of one or more computer(s) or other
device that is connected to a telecommunications network 1. A musical work is not communicated when it is
where the transmission of those works can be accessed by made available on a server.each subscriber independently of any other person having
access to the service . . . 3 2. A musical work is communicated by telecommu-
SOCAN’s intention in filing the tariff was to collect nication when a server containing the work
fees ‘‘by the entities that provide end users with access to responds to a request and packets are transmitted
the telecommunication networks, provided, however, over the Internet for the purpose of allowing the
that if some or all access providers are determined not to recipient to see or hear the work.
be liable or otherwise do not pay the approved fees, then 3. The public or private character of a communica-the tariff should provide for payment of the fees by other tion over the Internet can be determinedappropriate participants in the communication chain’’. 4 according to established legal and jurisprudentialSOCAN’s intent, in other words, was to collect royalties principles.from Internet intermediaries rather than from content
posters or publishers of content, unless Internet 4. A communication need not be instantaneous or
intermediaries were found not to be liable for infringe- simultaneous to be a communication to the
ment. 5 public.
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5. By making a work available, a person authorizes ● Second, when material requested by an Internet
its communication. user in Canada is stored on a server outside
Canada, does communication of that material6. The person who made a work available com-
occur only at the location of the server frommunicates it when it is transmitted from any
which it is transmitted?server (host, cache, mirror).
7. Persons who can avail themselves of para- ● Third, can Internet intermediaries be required to
graph 2.4(1)(b) of the Act with respect to a given pay a royalty because they ‘‘authorize’’ the com-
communication of a work do not communicate munication of music transmitted on the
the work. Generally speaking, this includes all Internet? In particular, does the operator of a
entities acting as Internet intermediaries, such as host server authorize the communication of
the ISP of the person who makes the work avail- music that it is stored, or does an Internet access
able, persons whose server acts as a cache or provider authorize the communication of the
mirror, the recipient’s ISP, and those who operate music requested by and transmitted to one of its
routers used in the transmission. subscribers?
8. An entity cannot claim the benefit of para-
In considering the scope of the common carriergraph 2.4(1)(b) with respect to a given communi-
exemption, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that threecation of a work if the relationships it entertains
things must be established for an intermediary’s activitywith the person who made the work available
to fall within paragraph 2.4(1)(b), and thus not attractare such that it can be said to act in concert with
liability for infringing copyright by communicating athat person or if it does not confine itself to the
work to the public by telecommunication. First, therole of an Internet intermediary.
intermediary’s activities must amount to the provision of
9. The person who creates an embedded hyperlink ‘‘the means of telecommunication’’; second, these means
to a work authorizes its communication. The must be ‘‘necessary’’ for enabling another person to com-
person who merely supplies a link that must be municate a work to the public; and third, the activities in
activated by the user does not. question must constitute the intermediary’s ‘‘only act’’
with respect to the communication.10. Communications occur at the site of the server
from which the work is transmitted, without
Evans J.A., writing for the majority of the Court,regard to the origin of the request or the loca-
agreed with the Board that the word ‘‘means’’ is capabletion of the original Web site. Therefore, to
of describing a wider range of services and equipmentoccur in Canada, a communication must origi-
than those provided by traditional common carriers, andnate from a server located in Canada on which
that it should not be given the narrow interpretationcontent has been posted.
urged by SOCAN.11 The majority held, however, that ‘‘a
11. The communication triggered by an embedded person provides only the means of telecommunication
hyperlink occurs at the site to which the link necessary for another person to communicate when,
leads. without that person’s activity, communication in that
12. The issue of whether an entity that provides medium of telecommunication would not be practi-
content outside Canada — with the intention cable or, in all probability, would not have occurred’’. 12
to communicate it specifically to recipients in Applying this test, the Court expressed the opinion that
Canada — is actually communicating it in the Board erred in law when it held that an Internet
Canada remains open. 8 intermediary who caches material is thereby providing
the means necessary for another to communicate it.
According to the Court, the fact that a cache enhances
the speed of transmission and reduces the cost to the
Federal Court of Appeal Ruling9 Internet access provider did not render the cache a prac-
tical necessity for communication.OCAN sought judicial review of the findings of theS Copyright Board. The issues in the review were the On the second issue, the Court disagreed with thefollowing: findings of the Board that for there to be a communica-
● First, when material is transmitted on the tion to the public in Canada, the communication had to
Internet, do the operator of the server on which originate from a server located in Canada. The Court
content is stored, and the entity supplying the held that a royalty may be made payable in Canada in
ultimate recipient with access to the Internet, respect of communications by telecommunication that
only provide ‘‘the means of telecommunication have a real and substantial connection with Canada. 13
necessary for another person to so communicate
the work ’’ within the meaning of para- On the third issue, the Court agreed with the Board
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actual knowledge of an alleged libel, are aware of no circum-nication, because they don’t have the right to control the
stances to put them on notice to suspect a libel, and com-actions of users. 14
mitted no negligence in failing to find out about the libel. 18
The paragraph was enacted by Parliament with the
intent of ensuring that liability would not be imposedIssues in Appeal in the Supreme
on intermediaries who supply software and hardware toCourt facilitate use of the Internet.
y the time the case reached the Supreme Court of In the sphere of telecommunications, the paragraphB Canada, the issues had been somewhat narrowed. was intended to encourage intermediaries to make tele-
The key questions to be decided in the appeal and cross- communications possible and to prevent liability that
appeal were the following: could chill such expansion. Parliament’s intent in this
regard is summarized in the following passages from the● First, are ISPs liable to pay royalties to SOCAN
Court’s reasons for decision:by reason only that they provide Internet access,
use caching facilities, and provide hosting ser- Parliament has decided that there is a public interest in
encouraging intermediaries who make telecommunicationsvices?
possible to expand and improve their operations without
● Second, does the common carrier exemption the threat of copyright infringement. To impose copyright
apply to protect ISPs from liability? liability on intermediaries would obviously chill that expan-
sion and development, as the history of caching demon-● Third, does the Copyright Act apply extra-terri-
strates. In the early years of the Internet, as the Board found,torially (e.g., is there liability if music is sent and its usefulness for the transmission of musical works was
received in Canada, received by Canadians and limited by ‘‘the relatively high bandwidth required to
transmitted from abroad, or transmitted from transmit audio files’’ (at p. 426) . . . The velocity of new
technical developments in the computer industry, and theCanada to receivers abroad)?
rapidly declining cost to the consumer, is legendary. Pro-
fessor Takach has unearthed the startling statistic that if the
automobile industry was able to achieve the same perform-
ance-price improvements as has the computer chip industry,Interpretation of Common Carrier
a car today would cost under five dollars and would getExemption 250,000 miles to the gallon of gasoline: see Takach, supra,
p. 21. Section 2.4(1)(b) reflects Parliament’s priority that thisn interpreting the scope of the common carrier
entrepreneurial push is to continue despite any incidentalI exemption, the Court generally agreed with the hold- effects on copyright owners.
ings of the Federal Court of Appeal, except with respect
In the Board’s view, the means ‘‘necessary’’ under s. 2.4(1)(b)to the issue of the interpretation of the word ‘‘necessary’’ were means that were content neutral and were necessary to
in paragraph 2.4(1)(b). In this respect, the Court agreed maximize the economy and cost-effectiveness of the
with the dissenting views expressed by Sharlow J.A. of Internet ‘‘conduit’’. That interpretation, it seems to me, best
promotes ‘‘the public interest in the encouragement andthe Court of Appeal that the term ‘‘necessary’’ was to be
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect’’ (Théberge,given a broader meaning and is satisfied if ‘‘the means
supra, at para. 30) without depriving copyright owners ofare reasonably useful and proper to achieve the benefits their legitimate entitlement . . .
of enhanced economy and efficiency’’. 15
. . . by enacting s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, Parliament
The Court was critical of the test espoused by Evans made a policy distinction between those who abuse the
Internet to obtain ‘‘cheap music’’ and those who are part ofJ.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal that protection is only
the infrastructure of the Internet itself. It is clear that Parlia-available ‘‘when, without that person’s activity, commu-
ment did not want copyright disputes between creators andnication in that medium of telecommunication would users to be visited on the heads of the Internet
not be practicable or, in all probability, would not have intermediaries, whose continued expansion and develop-
occurred’’. 16 According to the Supreme Court ment is considered vital to national economic growth. 19
This is a high eligibility test which could inhibit develop- The Court observed that Parliament did not say
ment of more efficient means of telecommunication. that the intermediaries are engaged in communicationSOCAN and others representing copyright owners would
of copyright content, but enjoy an immunity. Instead,always be able to argue that whatever the advances in the
paragraph 2.4(1)(b) says that such intermediaries arefuture, a telecommunication could still have been practi-
cable using the old technology, and that one way or the deemed, for purposes of the Copyright Act, not to com-
other the telecommunication would ‘‘in all probability’’ municate the work to the public at all. For the purposes
have occurred. In my view, with respect, Evans J.A. has of paragraph 3(1)(f) of the Act, Internet intermediariesplaced the bar too high. 17
are not ‘‘users’’.
The Court also held that paragraph 2.4(1)(b) is not a
The Court went on to explain that para-loophole but an important element of the balance struck
graph 2.4(1)(b) shields from liability the activities associ-by the statutory copyright scheme. The section,
ated with providing the means for another to communi-according to the Court,
cate by telecommunication. These means, as the Boardfinds its roots, perhaps, in the defense of innocent dissemi-
found, ‘‘. . . are not limited to routers and other hardware.nation sometimes available to bookstores, libraries, news
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nectivity services, hosting and other facilities and services s ion to  two common funct ions  o f  Internet
without which such communications would not intermediaries: hosting and caching. As to hosting, the
occur’’. 20 As a matter of legislative policy established by Board had found that a host server provider ‘‘merely
Parliament, the Act ‘‘does not impose liability for gives the customer [i.e., the content provider] the right to
infringement on intermediaries who supply software place information on the servers’’ 28 and was not gener-
and hardware to facilitate use of the Internet ’’. 21 ally liable for communications transmitted by the host
According to the Court, server operator. The Court agreed with not imposing
liability on host server operators. It is implicit from theSo long as an Internet intermediary does not itself engage in
acts that relate to the content of the communication, i.e. Court’s decision that in performing such functions, they
whose participation is content neutral, but confines itself to generally act as mere conduits without the requisite
providing ‘‘a conduit’’ for information communicated by degree of knowledge of infringement to make themothers, then it will fall within s. 2.4(1)(b). . . . To the extent
liable.they act as innocent disseminators, they are protected by
s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act. 22 Typically the host server provider will not monitor what is
posted to determine if it complies with copyright laws andIn this respect, the Court agreed with the approach
other legal restrictions. Given the vast amount of informa-of the Board, which had found that as long as the role of tion posted, it is impractical in the present state of the
an ISP in respect of any given transmission is limited to technology to require the host server provider to do so. In
providing the means necessary to allow data initiated by any event, it is unrealistic to attribute to a provider an
expertise in copyright law sufficient to ‘‘lawyer’’ all of theother persons to be transmitted over the Internet, and as
changing contents of its servers on an ongoing basis in thelong as the ancillary services it provides fall short of
absence of alleged infringements being brought to theirinvolving the act of communicating the work or author- attention.
izing its communication, it should be allowed to claim
However, to the extent the host server provider has notice ofthe exemption. The Court noted that this approach to copyrighted material posted on its server, it may, as the
the liability of suppliers of technological infrastructure is Board found, ‘‘respond to the complaint in accordance with
consistent with the approach taken by the Court in the the [Canadian Association of Internet Providers] Code of
Conduct [which] may include requiring the customer toElectric Despatch Co. of Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co.
remove the offending material through a ‘take downof Canada case, 23 with the Agreed Statement of Facts in
notice’’’. . . . If the host server provider does not comply withArticle 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 24 and with the the notice, it may be held to have authorized communica-
approach of the European Union in clause 42 of the tion of the copyright material, as hereinafter discussed. 29
E-Commerce Directive. 25 The Court did not go further and speculate as to
In refusing to find Internet intermediaries liable for whether an intermediary providing hosting services
providing the means to enable others to communicate might be liable for providing such services in circum-
works to the public, the Court drew a distinction stances where it knows or ought to know that the servers
between the conduit status of an Internet intermediary, it hosts contain infringing materials that are being com-
which does not attract liability, and other functions that municated to the public.
an Internet intermediary can perform, such as acting as a
As noted above, the majority in the Federal Court ofcontent provider, or creating embedded links that auto-
Appeal had concluded that the use of caching amountsmatically precipitate a telecommunication of copy-
to a function falling outside paragraph 2.4(1)(b). Thisrighted music from another source, which can attract
finding was premised on that Court’s view that the pro-liability. ‘‘In such cases, copyright liability may attach to
tection of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) is only available ‘‘when,the added functions. The protection provided by
without that person’s activity, communication in thats. 2.4(1)(b) relates to a protected function, not to all of the
medium of telecommunication would not be practi-activities of a particular Internet Service Provider’’. 26
cable or, in all probability, would not have occurred’’. 30
The Court held that the conduit status of an That test was found by the Supreme Court to be a high
Internet intermediary applies as long as the Internet eligibility test, which could inhibit development of more
intermediary does not itself engage in acts that relate to efficient means of telecommunication. The Court held
the content of the communication (i.e., whose participa- instead that something is ‘‘necessary’’, ‘‘which in the
tion is content neutral), but confines itself to providing accomplishment of a given object cannot be dispensed
‘‘a conduit’’ for information communicated by others. with, or it may mean something reasonably useful and
However, the presence of knowledge of the infringing proper, and of greater or lesser benefit or convenience’’. 31
nature of a work on the part of an ISP would, according
The Supreme Court noted that the Board hadthe Court, be a factor in the evaluation of that ‘‘conduit’’
found as a fact that in the early years of the Internet, ‘‘itsstatus. 27
usefulness for the transmission of musical works was
limited by ‘the relatively high bandwidth required to
transmit audio files’’’. 32 It also found that this technicalLiability For Hosting and Caching limitation was addressed in part by using ‘‘caches’’ and
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ness of the Internet ‘‘conduit’’. As a consequence of the tral technology used by Internet intermediaries to pro-
finding that the use of caching technologies were ‘‘neces- vide services to violate copyright is not necessarily
sary’’ to Internet communications and that such commu- sufficient to constitute authorization, as this requires a
nications ‘‘were content neutral’’, the Court held that demonstration that the defendant did give approval to,
paragraph 2.4(1)(b) applied to protect Internet sanction, permit, favour, or encourage the infringing con-
intermediaries from liability under paragraph 3(1)(f) of duct. The Court observed, however, that copyright lia-
the Act. bility may well attach if the activities of the Internet
Service Provider cease to be content neutral (e.g. if it hasIn the Board’s view, the means ‘‘necessary’’ under s. 2.4(1)(b)
were means that were content neutral and were necessary to notice that a content provider has posted infringing
maximize the economy and cost-effectiveness of the material on its system and fails to take remedial action).
Internet ‘‘conduit’’. That interpretation, it seems to me, best The Court’s reasons on this issue were expressed as fol-promotes ‘‘the public interest in the encouragement and
lows:dissemination of works of the arts and intellect’’ (Théberge,
supra, at para. 30) without depriving copyright owners of The operation of the Internet is obviously a good deal more
their legitimate entitlement. The creation of a ‘‘cache’’ copy, complicated than the operation of a photocopier, but it is
after all, is a serendipitous consequence of improvements in true here, as it was in the CCH case, that when massive
Internet technology, is content neutral, and in light of amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible to the
s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act ought not to have any legal bearing on end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service
the communication between the content provider and the Provider, based solely on the provision of Internet facilities,
end user. an authority to download copyrighted material as opposed
to non-copyrighted material. . . .As noted earlier, SOCAN successfully relied on the ‘‘exigen-
cies of the Internet’’ to defeat the appellants’ argument that The knowledge that someone might be using neutral tech-
they did not communicate a ‘‘musical work’’ but simply nology to violate copyright (as with the photocopier in the
packets of data that may or may not arrive in the correct CCH case) is not necessarily sufficient to constitute authori-
sequence. It is somewhat inconsistent, it seems to me, for zation, which requires a demonstration that the defendant
SOCAN then to deny the appellants the benefit of a similar did ‘‘[g]ive approval to; sanction, permit; favour, encourage’’
‘‘exigencies’’ argument. ‘‘Caching’’ is dictated by the need to . . . the infringing conduct. I agree that notice of infringing
deliver faster and more economic service, and should not, content, and a failure to respond by ‘‘taking it down’’ may in
when undertaken only for such technical reasons, attract some circumstances lead to a finding of ‘‘authorization’’.
copyright liability. 33 However, that is not the issue before us. Much would
depend on the specific circumstances. An overly quick infer-As with hosting, the Court did not speculate on the
ence of ‘‘authorization’’ would put the Internet Service Pro-potential liability of Internet intermediaries in circum-
vider in the difficult position of judging whether the copy-stances in which the intermediary plays a role in the right objection is well founded, and to choose between
selection of the content to be cached, or where the inter- contesting a copyright action or potentially breaching its
mediary is or could be aware of the content that is contract with the content provider. A more effective remedy
to address this potential issue would be the enactment bycached.
Parliament of a statutory ‘‘notice and take down’’ procedure
The decision of the Court on the liability of Internet as has been done in the European Community and the
intermediaries for caching under paragraph 3(1)(f) of the United States.
Act is consistent with laws in the U.S. and England, In sum, I agree with the Court of Appeal that ‘‘authoriza-
which do not impose liability on Internet intermediaries tion’’ could be inferred in a proper case but all would
depend on the facts. 36unless there is some element of volition or causation that
is lacking where the intermediary’s system is merely used
by a third party to create a copy or to effect a transmis-
sion. 34 It is also consistent with legislation in other coun-
Territorial Scope of the Copyrighttries that exempts Internet Service Providers from copy-
right liability for hosting and caching. 35 Act
nternet communications and the growth of e-com-Imerce raises significant conflicts-of-laws questions as
to the situs of conduct. The Internet is profoundly anti-Authorizing Infringement By
spacial and negates traditional geographic boundaries. AsProviding a Hosting Service 
a result, numerous cases around the globe have had to
he Supreme Court of Canada generally agreed with consider jurisdictional issues arising from Internet com-T the Federal Court of Appeal on the issue of the munications, including issues of personal, regulatory, and
liability of Internet intermediaries for authorizing even constitutional jurisdiction. 37 In the Tariff 22 case,
infringement. The Court observed that when massive the Court expressly recognized the jurisdictional
amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible to dilemmas caused by the Internet, and expressly acknowl-
the end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet edged that its was deciding the case before it ‘‘with an
Service Provider, based solely on the provision of eye to this broader context’’.
Internet facilities, an authority to download copyrighted The issue of the proper balance in matters of copyright plays
material as opposed to non-copyrighted material. Fur- out against the much larger conundrum of trying to apply
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respects no national boundaries . . . The availability of child and substantial connection’’ test. That test could be
pornography on the Internet is a matter of serious concern. applied to determine the location of the infringing
E-Commerce is growing. Internet liability is thus a vast field activity, as well as the location of the infringing activity ofwhere the legal harvest is only beginning to ripen. It is with
authorizing a communication that occurs when a con-an eye to this broader context that the relatively precise
questions raised by the Copyright Board must be consid- tent provider posts copyright material on a host server.
ered . . .
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada also
Canada clearly has a significant interest in the flow of infor- disagreed with the Board’s view that a communicationmation in and out of the country . . . A failure to recognize
that does not originate in Canada does not occur insuch jurisdiction ‘‘would have serious consequences in other
Canada. The Court expressed the view that this is ‘‘tooareas of law relevant to the Internet, including Canada’s
ability to deal with criminal and civil liability for objection- rigid and mechanical a test’’. According to the Court, an
able communications entering the country from abroad.’’ 38 Internet communication that crosses one or more
national boundaries ‘‘occurs’’ in more than one country,‘‘The Internet presents a particular challenge to
at a minimum the country of transmission and thenational copyright laws which are typically territorial in
country of reception. At the end of the transmission, thenature.’’ 39 Parliament’s power to legislate with extraterri-
end user has a work in his or her possession that was nottorial effect is well settled as a matter of Canadian law.40
there before. The work has, necessarily, been communi-‘‘However, while the Parliament of Canada, unlike the
cated, irrespective of its point of origin. The Court, there-legislatures of the Provinces, has the legislative compe-
fore, concluded that the Copyright Board erred in lawtence to enact laws having extraterritorial effect, it is
when it ignored all connecting factors other than thepresumed not to intend to do so, in the absence of clear
location of the host server for the purpose of identifyingwords or necessary implication to the contrary’’. 41 This
communications that occur in Canada.presumption flows from the principle of territoriality, a
tenet of international law. Because each state is sovereign Having found that the Board erred in holding that
in its own territory, it is presumed that states hesitate to the only relevant connection between Canada and the
exercise jurisdiction over matters that may take place in communication is the location of the host server, the
the territory of other states. 42 But, as noted above, this Court next had to determine, as a matter of statutory
presumption is rebuttable where the contrary intention interpretation, what connecting factors are sufficient to
is expressly stated or implied by the legislation. 43 impose copyright liability for transborder communica-
tions. In considering this issue, the Court noted that inA central issue raised in the Tariff 22 case concerned
the absence of clear words to the contrary, courts pre-when a communication of a musical work was consid-
sume that Parliament does not intend its legislation toered to have occurred in Canada. According to the Copy-
receive extraterritorial application. Further, the Courtright Board, 44 to occur in Canada, a communication
recognized that copyright law respects the territorialmust originate from a server located in Canada on which
principle, reflecting the implementation of a ‘‘web ofcontent has been placed. As summarized above, the
interlinking international treaties’’ 45 based on the prin-Board held that the place of origin of the request, the
ciple of national treatment. 46 The Court expressed thelocation of the person posting the content, and the loca-
opinion that these principles could be satisfied bytion of the original Web site are irrelevant. It also held
applying the ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ test tothat posting content on a server located outside of
determine whether there is a sufficient connectionCanada does not constitute a communication of the
between Canada and transborder communication forwork to the public in Canada. However, the Board left
Canada to apply its law consistent with the ‘‘principles ofopen the issue of whether an entity that provides content
order and fairness’’.outside Canada with the intention to communicate it
specifically to recipients in Canada is communicating it The ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ test had pre-in Canada. viously been adopted and developed by the Supreme
The views expressed by the Copyright Board in the Court of Canada in numerous cases. 47 From the outset,
Tariff 22 case, as to what activities need occur in Canada however, this test had been viewed as an appropriate
for a communication to the public to be complete, were way to prevent overreaching, and to restrict the exercise
criticized on appeal by the Federal Court of Appeal. The of jurisdiction over extraterritorial and transnational
Federal Court of Appeal expressed the opinion that since transactions, in a manner consistent with the principles
the very notion of communication requires a communi- of international comity, order, and fairness. 48 Historically,
cator and an intended recipient, it was wrong for the the test was not applied as a principle of statutory con-
Board to have concluded that the location of the com- struction or legislative jurisdiction to achieve certainty,
munication should solely be determined by that of the ease of application, and predictability in determining the
host server. This was especially the case as the Board had substantive law to be applied to a dispute. The test
found that the Internet communications under consider- applied only to the courts. 49 As noted, above, however, in
ation were only ever affected at the request of the end the Tariff 22 case, the Supreme Court applied the ‘‘real
user. According to the Court, the proper test to apply to and substantial connection’’ test to determining the






























































Case Comment: SOCAN v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers 155
cations that have international participants. The use of telecommunication in both the state of transmission and
this test will undoubtedly be applied in future copyright the state of reception. The Court recognized this poten-
cases. Further, in view of the Court’s statement that the tial problem but observed that ‘‘as with other fields of
case was being decided ‘‘with an eye’’ to the broader overlapping liability (taxation for example), the answer
context of Internet liability, it can be expected that the lies in the making of international or bilateral agree-
real and substantial link test will be applied in a variety ments, not in national courts straining to find some juris-
of other cases involving trans-border communications. dictional infirmity in either State’’. 50
The Court observed that whether or not a real and
substantial connection exists in any particular fact situa-
tion will turn on the facts of a particular transmission. In
this regard, the Court noted that foreign content prov- Conclusion 
iders whose music is telecommunicated to a Canadian
end user will not automatically be subject to liability; a he Tariff 22 case is the most significant case to be
content provider will not necessarily be immunized T decided to date in Canada in the area of liability for
from copyright liability by virtue only of the fact that it the communication of works over the Internet. It is also
employs a host server outside the country; and con- the first of what will undoubtedly be further cases to be
versely, a host server does not attract liability just because decided by the Supreme Court and other Canadian
it is located in Canada. The decision of the Court raises courts on the applicability of the real and substantial link
the spectre of imposition of copyright liability on a single test to Internet communications.
Notes:
1 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. given object cannot be dispensed with, or it may mean something rea-
sonably useful and proper, and of greater or lesser benefit or convenience,2 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Cana-
and its force and meaning must be determined with relation to thedian Association of Internet Service Providers, 2004 S.C.C. 45 [Tariff 22].
particular object sought’’. Supra note 2 at para. 91, Binnie J. citing Black’s3 Copyright Board: Statement of Proposed Royalties to be Collected by Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. ‘‘necessary’’ (emphasis by the Court).
SOCAN for the Public Performance or the Communication to the Public 16 Supra note 9 at 57, cited by the Supreme Court of Canada. Ibid. atby Telecommunication, in Canada, of Musical or Dramatico-Musical
para. 113.Works for the Year 1999, C. Gaz. I. 1998. Supplement June 13 at 26,
online: Canada Gazette http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/1998/ 17 Supra note 2 at para. 113.
19980613/pdf/g1-13224.pdf. 18 Ibid. at para. 89 citing Menear v. Miguna (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 602 (Gen.4 Ibid. Div.), rev’d on other grounds (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 223 (C.A.); Newton v.
City of Vancouver (1932), 46 B.C.R. 67 (S.C.); Sun Life Assurance Co. of5 The breadth of SOCAN’s intended targets is evident from the definition
Canada v. W.H. Smith & Son, Ltd., [1933] All E.R. 432 (C.A.). See generallyof the term ‘‘Telecommunications Service’’ found in the tariff. That term
R.E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed., loose-leaf (Cars-was defined as follows:
well: Scarborough, 1994) vol. 1, at §7.12(6).‘‘Telecommunications service’’ includes a service known as a com-
19 Supra note 2 at paras. 114-115, 131.puter on-line service, an electronic bulletin board service (BBS), a
network server or a service provider or similar operation that 20 Supra note 6 at 452, cited by the Supreme Court of Canada. Ibid. at
provides for or authorizes the digital encoding, random access para. 92.
and/or storage of musical works or portions of musical works in a
21 Supra note 2 at para. 101.digitally encoded form for the transmission of those musical works
in digital form via a telecommunications network or that provides 22 Ibid. para. 92, 95.
access to such a telecommunications network to a subscriber’s 23 (1891), 20 S.C.R. 83, at 9.computer or other device that allows the transmission of material
to be accessed by each subscriber independently of any other 24 WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, CRNR/DC/94, 36 I.L.M.
person having access to the service. Ibid. at 27. 65 online: WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htm
[WCT].6 SOCAN Statement of Royalties, Public Performance of Musical Works
1996, 1997, 1998 (Tariff 22, Internet) (Re), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417. 25 E-Commerce Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society7 Ibid. at 52.
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Direc-8 Ibid. at 50–52. tive on electronic commerce), [2000] O.J.L. 178/1, online: Europa http://
9 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Cana- europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/ecommerce [E-Commerce
dian Assn. of Internet Providers, [2002] 4 F.C. 3. Directive].
10 Section 2.4(1)(b) of the Act reads as follows: ‘‘a person whose only act in 26 Supra note 2 at para. 102.
respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter to the 27 Ibid. at para. 99. Section 2.4(1)(b) does not contain any reference to apublic consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary
knowledge requirement. Unfortunately, the Court did not explain whyfor another person to so communicate the work or other subject matter
the presence or absence of knowledge would contribute to the conduitdoes not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public’’.
status of an ISP.Supra note 1.
28 Supra note 6 at 441, cited by the Supreme Court of Canada at para. 109.11 Supra note 9 at 57.
29 Supra note 2 at paras. 109-110, citing the Federal Court of Appeal supra12 Ibid.
note 9 at 441.13 Ibid. at 75.
30 Supra note 9 at 57, cited by the Supreme Court of Canada at para. 113.14 Ibid. at 61.
31 Supra note 2 at para. 91, Binnie J. citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed.,15 The Court pointed out that the meaning of the term ‘‘necessary’’ varies
s.v. ‘‘necessary’’ (emphasis by the Court).with the context. Quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court noted
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33 Ibid. at paras. 115-116. tion]; North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government
of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Gov-34 The Court referenced the Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-
ernment of the United States of America, December 17, 1992, [1994]line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
Can. T.S. No. 2, online: International Trade Canada http://www.dfait-case acknowledging that a comparable result had been achieved in the
maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/agree-en.asp [NAFTA]; Agreement on Trade-U.S.
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, being Annex 1C of the35 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §512 (1998), s. 512; E- Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15
Commerce Directive, supra note 23, preamble clauses 42–46, arts. 12–15; April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, online: World Trade Organization http://
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs [TRIPS].
22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 46 The national treatment principle implies a territorial approach to choicerelated rights in the information society, O.J.L. 167/10, Art. 5(1), online:
of law, pursuant to which the applicable law is the law of the place whereEuropa http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/doc-
the conduct in question occurs. This principle is needed because eachuments/documents_en.htm; Australia, Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) as
nation’s intellectual property laws are assumed not to apply extraterritori-amended by Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth)
ally. Extraterritorial application of a nation’s copyright laws would sub-s. 39B, online: Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department
vert the national treatment principle. The minimum rights principle ishttp://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/244/top.htm.
also inconsistent with extraterritorial application of a nation’s copyright36 Supra note 2 at paras. 123, 127-128, citing CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law laws. The right to choose the particular standards of local law, over and
Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para. 38 [CCH]. above the minimum standard, would be undermined if other nations
37 See Barry Sookman, Computer, Internet and E-Commerce Law (Cars- could override that choice through extraterritorial application of their
well: Scarborough, 2000–2004), Chapter 11. own standards. See, Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM–Pathe Communications, 24
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) at 1097-1098; Murray v. British Broadcasting38 Supra note 2 at paras. 41, 62.
Corp., 81 F.3d 287 (2nd Cir. 1996) at 290; Berne Convention, ibid. Art. 5;39 Ibid. headnote. See also P.E. Geller, ‘‘Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Curtis A. Bradley, ‘‘Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in An Age of
Rethinking International Copyright in a Digitally Networked World’’ Globalism’’ (1997) 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 505 at 16-17, 28; Graeme W. Austin,
(1996) 20 Colum. V.L.A.-J.L. & Arts 571; Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘‘Global Use/ ‘‘Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational
Territorial Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Copyright Infringement Litigation’’ (1999) 23 Colum.-V.L.A. J.L. & Arts 1
Information Infrastructure’’ (1995) 42 J. Copyright Soc’y. U.S.A. 318. at 11-12; Graeme W. Austin, ‘‘Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law of
Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace’’ (2000) 79 Or. L. Rev. 575 at 4;40 Reference re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R.
Andreas P. Reindl ‘‘Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on792 at 816; Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] 1
Global Networks’’ (1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 799 at 5-6, 11–14.S.C.R. 86 at 103; Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156.
41 Supra note 2 at para. 54. 47 See, for example, Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
1077; Hunt v. T & N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 342 Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 at 1078.
S.C.R. 1022; Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V. (Trustees43 Bolduc v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 573 at 578; Arcadi of), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 907; Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite
v. The King, [1932] S.C.R. 158 at 159. Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205; Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of
44 Supra note 6 at 51-52. British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63; Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R.
416.45 Supra note 2 at para. 56, citing David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2000) at 14. Canada adheres to multilateral and bilateral 48 Ibid.
treaties that regulate the protection of copyright territorially. The prin- 49 Supra note 2 at para 147, Lebel J. in dissent. See, for example, Unifundcipal treaties include the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia 2003 SCC 40 atand Artistic Works (Paris Act of July 2, 1971, as amended September 28, paras. 54–91 (the Supreme Court distinguished the personal jurisdic-1979), [1998] Can. T.S. No. 18 [Berne Convention]; Universal Copyright tional cases from the case of the territorial application of provincialConvention, September 6, 1952, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, online: UNESCO legislation and held that the principles of order and fairness required thathttp://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15241&URL_DO= Ontario’s Insurance Act not be given extra-territorial application);DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [UCC]; International Conven- Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (the Supreme Court rejected thetion for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and application of the real and substantial connection test in favour of the lawBroadcasting Organizations, October 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 online: governing the place of the tort (the lex loci delicti).UNESCO http://portal .unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13645
&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [Rome Conven- 50 Supra note 2 at para. 78.
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